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Gregory French*

On the Operation of the Quieting of Titles
Act in Newfoundland and Labrador

This paper examines the operation of the Quieting of Titles Act in Newfoundland
and Labrador, and in particular its operation in uncontested matters, from which
written decisions do not emanate. Written decisions under the Quieting of Titles
Act, particularly those at the appellate level, do not accurately reflect the operation
of the statute in the uncontested context. This paper examines both reported and
unreported decisions under the Act, and compares to Nova Scotia’s approach to
resolving similar land title challenges, to provide clarity on the proper operation of
the Act in practice.

Dans le présent article, nous examinons l’application de la Quieting of Titles Act
de Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador, et en particulier son application dans les affaires
non contestées, dont les décisions écrites ne sont pas publiées. Ces décisions
rendues en vertu de la loi, en particulier celles rendues en appel, ne reflètent
pas fidèlement l’application de la loi dans les situations non contestées. Nous
examinons les décisions publiées et non publiées rendues en vertu de cette loi et
les comparons à l’approche adoptée par la Nouvelle-Écosse pour résoudre des
contestations similaires de titres fonciers, afin de clarifier le fonctionnement de la
loi dans la pratique.

*
BA (Hons), LLB, barrister and solicitor at Mills, Pittman & Twyne, Clarenville, NL. This paper
is a companion work to the author’s presentation “Quieting of Titles: An Introduction” (Canadian Bar
Association, NL Branch, 27 September 2021). The author acknowledges with graditude the assistance
of the Hon Garrett Handrigan of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador for his work and
research with the presentation, which led to the writing of this paper.
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Introduction
The Quieting of Titles Act1 in Newfoundland and Labrador provides a
mechanism for those with unmarketable land title to obtain certification
of their title through the courts. The statute operates in the shadows of the
common law: proceedings are begun, and often end, ex parte. There are no
reported decisions of successful unchallenged quietings, which constitute
the majority of quieting of titles proceedings. Reported caselaw under the
QTA arises only in contested inter partes proceedings. Decisions of the
Court of Appeal dealing with the substance of the Act are rarer, as they
arise only when these contested inter partes proceedings are appealed.
As a result, the leading cases from the Court of Appeal arise in specific
and uncommon circumstances. This gives an inaccurate depiction of
the law under the QTA that is unrepresentative of the normal operation
of the Act in unreported, uncontested proceedings. Part I of this paper
explores briefly the history and purposes of the Act. Part II reviews the
appellate caselaw, and issues these decisions raise. Part III contextualizes
the Court of Appeal jurisprudence within the larger framework of reported
and a selection of unreported Supreme Court decisions under the QTA
to establish the proper operation of the Act. This section also compares
the Newfoundland QTA process to that under a similar Nova Scotia title
1.

RSNL 1990, c Q-3 [QTA].
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rectification statute as authority and justification for the suggested proper
operation of the QTA in uncontested proceedings.
I. The history and purposes of the Quieting of Titles Act
The QTA became part of the law of Newfoundland and Labrador one
hundred years ago, in 1921.2 Its legislative history was concisely set out by
Justice of Appeal Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Bonavista-TrinityPlacentia Integrated School District v United Church of Little Catalina of
the Newfoundland Conference of the United Church of Canada (Trustee
of).3 In the early 20th century, the Western Union Telegraph Company
was attempting to acquire properties in rural areas of the Dominion
of Newfoundland, but it found those properties’ titles rested on mere
occupation and not on any chain of title. Many landowners in possession
of those properties either had not met the threshold for obtaining title by
adverse possession against the Crown or had otherwise uncertain roots of
title. The foreign company, encountering Newfoundland’s anarchic system
of property law, was disinclined to invest without some mechanism of
obtaining title with certainty.4 The root of these problems was the centuries
of unrecognized illegal occupation of the Colony of Newfoundland that
predated the creation of its domestic legislature in 1832. Imperial legislation
forbade settlement in Newfoundland for centuries, until those restrictions
were lifted in the early 19th century.5 As a result, much of Newfoundland
had been settled with no legally recognized titles. The Supreme Court of
Newfoundland’s decision in R v Kough in 1819 confirmed that the English
rule of 60 years’ occupation would bar a claim of the Crown to recover
land.6 However, this required satisfactory proof of occupation for a period
of sixty years. In rural areas, where poverty was rampant and government
was largely absent, settlers had neither the means nor the inclination to
obtain clear title to their lands from the central government in St. John’s.7
This context led to the passage of the QTA in the 1920s.

2.
SN 1921, Cap 21.
3.
(1994), 124 Nfld & PEIR 1 at paras 42-54, 49 ACWS (3d) 1332 (CA) [Bonavista-TrinityPlacentia].
4.
Land title was a matter of little importance in rural areas of the province, where land was plentiful
and the population largely impoverished. See Gregory French, “The Abolition of Adverse Possession
of Crown Lands in Newfoundland and Labrador” (2020) 71 UNB LJ 227 at 228-230 [French,
“Abolition of Adverse Possession”]; Gregory French, “Property Interests in Resettled Communities”
(2015) 66 UNB LJ 210 at 211=214 [French, “Property Interests”].
5.
See French, “Abolition of Adverse Possession,” supra note 4 at 228-229.
6.
(1819) 1 Nfld LR 172 (SC) [Kough]. Newfoundland property law functioned in an uncomfortable
legal vacuum from the creation of the Supreme Court in 1792 until the establishment of the legislature
in 1832. See Kough at 173; R v Row (1818), 1 Nfld LR 126 at 127 [Row].
7.
See generally French, “Property Interests,” supra note 4 at 211-214.
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Given the above, title may be well accepted within communities but
fail to meet accepted standards of good and marketable title. The title itself
may not be in dispute, but its uncertain state may be unsatisfactory to
a prospective purchaser. This uncertainty originates from the historical
haphazard patterns of settlement of Newfoundland and Labrador. One
would expect the power vested in courts under the QTA to be quite broad
by necessity, given the social context in which the Act operates. The Act
is ameliorative and the standards employed therein are worded in general
language. The Act contemplates an applicant having imperfect or defective
title that, nonetheless, may not be challenged by those who would have a
right to do so. The expectation is that a proceeding under the Act would
be commenced only by someone with imperfect title who has a legitimate
claim to assert.
The QTA permits an applicant to request an investigation of their title
and allows the court to either grant or reject the certificate of title. At the
outset, the Act itself is expressly investigatory rather than adversarial.8
Unlike traditional litigation, the Act does not contemplate the appearance
of an adverse party when a proceeding is commenced. Proceedings may
begin and end without any objection being filed or any adverse party
materializing. Because a proceeding under the Act is in rem rather than in
personam, the existence of adverse parties in the litigation is immaterial to
the effect and scope of the outcome.9 The land itself is on trial, and anyone
contesting the applicant’s claim to title is expected to file an adverse
claim and appear in court, or else the applicant will receive a certificate of
title from the court. The certificate of title is determinative of title and is
binding against the world.10
A person claiming to be the owner of the land may start a proceeding
as of right.11 A person claiming an interest or estate in the land may apply
for an investigation, ascertainment or declaration of title with leave of
the court.12 In both circumstances, the Act does not provide any specific
8.
QTA, supra note 1, ss 3(1)-(2). The process up to s 13 in the Act contemplates no other parties
except the applicant, who must prove entitlement to the land. Section 13 permits the applicant to apply
for a certificate of title and the granting of same by the court. Adverse parties are not mentioned until
s 14 of the Act.
9.
Dyke v Bradley, 2017 NLTD(G) 109 at paras 27-30.
10. QTA, supra note 1, s 26.
11. Ibid, s 3(1).
12. Ibid, s 3(2). Jurisprudence refers to this section as creating a “counterpetition,” which arises
when an adverse claimant asserts an ownership interest in an applicant’s property. See Re Dyer Estate,
2011 NLCA 81 at paras 12-17 [Dyer Estate]. However, one questions whether there is any practical
distinction between a petition under s 3(1) of the Act and a “counterpetition” as envisaged by the
Court of Appeal in Dyer Estate. A “counterpetition” would still involve a claim of ownership, which
is a proceeding as of right under s 3(1). The author suggests that the proper application of s 3(2) is to
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standard of title. With the exception of specific rules for divesting the
Crown at section 13(3), the court’s discretion under the Act is quite broad:
the judge must be “satisfied respecting the title” and consider that “the
certificate may be safely granted without another notice of application other
than the published or posted notice.”13 Where the judge “considers that the
applicant is entitled to the land,” the court may grant the certificate.14
The structure of section 13 is somewhat confusing. There are two
standards to consider for obtaining a certificate under section 13: a judge may
be “satisfied respecting the title” that a certificate “can be safely granted”
under 13(1), and the applicant may be “entitled to the land” under 13(2).15
None of these terms are defined, and no judicial commentary distinguishes
these subsections. Nonetheless, such broad terms are harmonious with the
legislative history and intent: they reflect the intention that an applicant’s
claim of “entitlement” should be “satisfactory” and “safely granted.”16
Courts today are expected to deal with the same complex historical
and possessory claims to land that vexed the Supreme Court since its
inception.17 The legislature clearly appreciated the difficulty that land
tenure posed to Newfoundland and Labrador’s development, as foreign
investors did not wish to deal with land ownership in its state of disarray.18
The same concerns about possessory title arose again in the 1970s, when
adverse possession against the Crown became an issue for the legislature to
resolve.19 Thus, it is reasonable to interpret the Act as giving broad power
to courts to resolve such matters, in the interest of stabilizing land title.
However, two reported cases of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of
Appeal cast doubt on the broadness of the scope of the Act.
II. Appellate caselaw on the Quieting of Titles Act: criticisms and
context
As noted in the introduction, appellate caselaw under the QTA has arisen
only in exceptional circumstances. The QTA contemplates a full proceeding
which may involve only the applicant from beginning to end. Written
decisions are not released in cases where the applicant is successful and
address other property interests short of ownership. See e.g. Power Motors Ltd v Irving Oil Ltd (1993),
110 Nfld & PEIR 290, 346 APR 290 (Nfld SC (TD)) [Power Motors 1993 cited to Nfld & PEIR];
Power Motors Ltd v Irving Oil Ltd (1996), 146 Nfld & PEIR 330, 456 APR 330 (Nfld SC (CA)).
13. QTA, supra note 1, s 13(1).
14. Ibid, s 13(2).
15. Ibid, ss 13(1)-13(2).
16. Ibid, s 13(1).
17. See e.g. Row, supra note 6; Kough, supra note 6; The King v Cuddihy (1831), 2 Nfld LR 8; The
King v Luke Ryan (1831), 2 Nfld LR 47.
18. See e.g. Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia, supra note 3 at paras 43-44.
19. See generally French, “Abolition of Adverse Possession,” supra note 4 at 231-235.
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the claim uncontested. In such circumstances, there is no reason for the
court to explain its rationale.
In comparing the number of certificates of title issued and the number
of reported decisions citing the QTA, it is apparent that the vast majority of
proceedings under the Act do not result in written decisions. In searching
the Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Deeds online service by
document type back to 1980,20 one sees that from 1980 to 2020, 2,598
certificates of title have been issued by the Supreme Court and registered
at the Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Deeds.21 The number of
reported decisions citing to the QTA is notably lower.22 Most proceedings
that successfully result in the issuance of a certificate of title appear
uncontested or resolved short of trial. The reported cases are all contested
proceedings, where an adverse party challenges the applicant’s claim.
Proceedings under the Act change significantly when an adverse claim
arises. In Newfoundland (Attorney General) v O’Brien, Justice Goodridge
described the shift in process when an adverse claim is filed:
All such applications are made ex parte in the first instance and assuming
no adverse claim is filed the applicant becomes entitled to a certificate
of title upon showing that he has complied with the act and satisfied the
judge that a certificate of title ought to be issued.
Where, however, an adverse claim is filed the situation becomes
adversary.
There is then in whatever form it may appear an action between two
persons, one the petitioner, the other the respondent and there would not,
in my view, be any justification for relaxing the rules of evidence in such
a contest.
It ceases to be investigative. The procedure contemplated by section 8
has terminated and an issue has come into existence which ought to be
tried according to the ordinary rules of evidence although some deviation
20. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, “CADO” (last visited 24 February 2022),
online: Companies and Deeds Online <cado.eservices.gov.nl.ca/CADOInternet/Main.aspx> [perma.
cc/77AH-GUXP]. CADO allows one to search the Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Deeds
index by document type back to 1980. Documents from 1982 onward are available for viewing online.
21. This figure was obtained by searching by document type (as “Quieting of Titles”), in five-year
increments from 1 January 1980 to 31 December 2019. For reference, the number of Certificates
of Title registered by decade is as follows: 1980–1989: 1,018 Certificates registered. 1990–1999:
938 Certificates registered. 2000–2009: 343 Certificates registered. 2010–2019: 299 Certificates
registered.
22. A review of the CanLII database, which (at the time of writing) has continuous coverage of
reported decisions of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador back to 1 January 1987,
discloses only 94 reported decisions citing to the QTA. This figure includes any reference to the Act,
including cases which were not quieting proceedings. When compared to the number of certificates
registered, supra note 21, one notes the significant discrepancy.

On the Operation of the Quieting of Titles Act
in Newfoundland and Labrador

7

from the ordinary rules of procedure is indicated by the act.23

This context should be borne in mind when reviewing the appellate
caselaw. As the appellate cases are contested proceedings, not investigatory
proceedings, the process changes substantially.
In the 1983 case of Pawlett v Newfoundland, the Court of Appeal
overturned the granting of a certificate of title to the applicants.24 The
applicants’ predecessor in title had been approved for a grant of land under
an agricultural statute. An Order-in-Council was made for a grant to be
issued to the applicants’ predecessor in 1918. For reasons unknown, the
grant had never been issued. The District Court had allowed the quieting
application and issued a certificate of title to the applicants.25 The Court of
Appeal overturned this decision, holding as follows:
The purpose of the Quieting of Titles Act is to confirm title to land in a
person (or persons) who is able to prove to a judge’s satisfaction that his
claim to the land is valid. That title would have to be shown to stem from
a legal basis or, in the alternative, be based on possession. As section 2 of
the Act states, it is an investigation of a claimed “title” to land. Thus, the
legal sufficiency of that title, legal or otherwise, must be demonstrated
to satisfy the Court that a certificate should issue declaring the claimant
to be the “legal and beneficial owner in fee simple” of the land. In the
present case, the respondents clearly had no legal title and neither was
there any evidence of possession so as to create an “equitable” title.
Thus, the remedy of the Quieting of Titles Act is not open to them more
especially when, as here, the title claimed stems from an alleged right to
a Crown grant that was never issued.26

The above reasoning is flawed when considering the origin and
legislative purpose of the Act. With respect, it is unreasonable to suggest
that an individual with legally sufficient title would avail of cumbersome
and costly proceedings under the QTA. Were the court’s powers limited to
granting certificates for legally sufficient title, the QTA would be wholly
unnecessary. Those with good title would have no need for the Act, and
those with defective title would find no benefit under it. The court began
with the correct statement of the purpose of the Act: “to confirm title to
land in a person or persons who is able to prove to a judge’s satisfaction
that his claim to the land is valid.”27 That is the extent of what the Act
23. Newfoundland (Attorney General) v O’Brien (1979), 27 Nfld & PEIR 269 at paras 44-47, 74
APR 269 (Nfld SC (TD)) [O’Brien].
24. (1983), 41 Nfld & PEIR 349, 119 APR 349 (CA) [Pawlett cited to Nfld & PEIR]
25. Ibid at paras 2-7.
26. Ibid at para 9.
27. Ibid.
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statutorily requires; it imposes no limitation periods, no standards of title,
and no restrictions on the nature or origin of title. What follows in the
above-cited paragraph exceeds what the statute requires and is a creation
of the court. It is, with respect, an unnecessary and burdensome declaration
that is at odds with the legislative purpose and intent. If it were applied to
all proceedings under the QTA, it would have the effect of handicapping
the purposes for which the Act was originally introduced.
In a later summary of the purpose of the law in Bonavista-TrinityPlacentia, Justice Marshall cited to the debate in the Legislative Council
chamber on the passage of the QTA.28 In those debates, Sir Patrick McGrath
explicitly remarked that part of the motivation for passing the QTA was
that “the original owners had got [the land] by squatters’ rights and had
not occupied it for the period of sixty years necessary for them to get
a title as against the Crown.”29 The acknowledged problem at the time
the law was passed was that individuals could not meet the requirements
for good title but had a legitimate claim that should be adjudicated. This
presumes a bona fide claim falling short of being good title. One should
note that later application of Pawlett in the Supreme Court broadened the
interpretation of the restrictive paragraph 9 to a general “legal basis” of
title which persuades the Court that a certificate should issue.30
The Court of Appeal reached the correct outcome in Pawlett, but not
for the reasons stated above. The matter could simply have been determined
on the basis of section 13(3) of the QTA, which is cited later in paragraph
9 of the Court’s reasons. Section 13(3) of the Act states that to divest the
Crown, the land must either originate in a Crown grant or conveyance,
or be based upon adverse possession for the appropriate period of time.
Neither of those circumstances arose in Pawlett: the land was abandoned
after 1920, and the grant to which the applicants’ predecessor was entitled
had never been issued.31 These facts would have been sufficient to dispose
of the matter without the additional commentary on the general scope of
the Act.
The later Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia case builds on the Pawlett
decision, but with notable controversy. Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia
involved a similar dispute of title where an applicant had sought a certificate
of title in the absence of a conveyance from the superior titleholder. A
school district sought title to a piece of land on which a school had been
28. At the time, the Legislative Council was the upper chamber of Newfoundland’s legislative
branch.
29. Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia, supra note 3 at para 43.
30. George Quieting of Titles, 2012 NLTD(G) 196 at paras 4-5 [George].
31. Pawlett, supra note 24 at paras 2-4.
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built. Under statute, the religious denomination holding title to school
land (in this case, the Newfoundland Conference of the United Church of
Canada) was required to transfer the land to the school district. This transfer
did not occur, and the United Church Conference refused to transfer the
land in deference to the local community church’s instructions. The school
district sought a quieting of title application in lieu of obtaining a deed
from the United Church.32 The trial judge determined it was premature to
seek a quieting, since the applicant could seek specific performance for
a conveyance of the land from the United Church Conference.33 Justice
of Appeal Cameron, writing for herself and Justice O’Neill, overturned
the trial judge’s ruling and remitted the matter for reconsideration, on the
basis that the trial judge had failed to consider both the actual possession
by the school district and the potential effect of the Schools Act provisions
on vesting title into the school district.34 However, Justices Cameron and
O’Neill both went further, commenting on the effect of the earlier Pawlett
decision. Relying on paragraph 9 of Pawlett, they wrote:
In my view, the trial judge has no authority under the Quieting of Titles
Act to vest an outstanding interest. He would have no power to order
specific performance of contractual obligations by the Newfoundland
Conference of the United Church of Canada, if he were to conclude that
was the only impediment to good title, nor could he ignore the existence
of an impediment no matter how insignificant or technical it might seem
when determining if the certificate should be granted.35

Like Pawlett, this statement goes unnecessarily far in restricting the court’s
powers under the QTA. The majority read into the statute limiting words
that are not apparent in the Act and that defy the legislative intent. If a trial
judge is bound to enforce any impediment, “no matter how insignificant or
technical,”36 as the majority stated, then the QTA becomes a dead-letter law.
Nobody with title to that standard applies under the Act. Those who apply
should be expected to have some manner of title defect requiring recourse
to the QTA, as was the stated intent at the time of the Act’s passage.37
Like Pawlett, the majority decision reached the correct outcome on the
facts but strayed into unnecessary territory to do so. In a contest between
two claimants to the land, where an adverse claimant has a superior title to
the applicant and is not otherwise dispossessed, the court should defer to
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia, supra note 3 at paras 21-32.
Ibid at paras 33-34.
Ibid at paras 17-18.
Ibid at para 13.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 44.
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the title of the adverse claimant. This is a sensible proposition in a contested
proceeding with competing claimants: the party with superior title wins. If
the legal titleholder appears and objects to the application, the onus falls to
the applicant to demonstrate why the legal titleholder should not succeed.
This occurred in Pawlett,38 and the matter in Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia
was remitted for the trial judge to determine on that basis.39
Unlike Pawlett, the Court of Appeal in Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia was
not unanimous in its reasoning. All members of the panel agreed that the
matter should be remitted to the trial judge for reconsideration.40 However,
Justice of Appeal Marshall, writing for himself, went significantly further
in his examination of the matter. Justice Marshall’s reasons extensively
canvass the legislative history and purpose of the QTA and examine the Act
in its current form. His reasons provide useful guidance for the conduct
of a quieting of titles application, following both the spirit and letter of
the law. In Justice Marshall’s view, “[t]he Act affords a complete code for
resolution of claims and disputes bearing upon whether a certificate of title
is warranted.”41 This is a sensible proposition, since separate proceedings
for related relief on the same question of law would “foster an unnecessary
multiplicity and prolixity of proceedings which is neither conducive to
the timely resolution of issues nor to the operation of justice.”42 While
the Newfoundland Conference of the United Church of Canada had not
been a party at the trial level, the remedy for this lies in provisions of the
QTA permitting the Court to direct further notice to non-parties.43 Such
a situation would also fall under the statutory category permitting the
applicant to adduce further evidence to address the Court’s concerns.44
The majority decision rejected Justice Marshall’s comprehensive
reasoning, due in large part to reliance on the Pawlett decision. However,
his reasons may be appropriately rejected on the unique facts of the case.
Recall that this was a contested application with a superior titleholder who
had not been named as a party in the first instance. The majority, citing
to Pawlett, held that a judge under the QTA cannot compel the adverse
claimant or a third party to do anything to vest title into an applicant.
The applicant either has a valid claim of title at the time of application or

38. Pawlett, supra note 24 at para 9.
39. Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia, supra note 3 at paras 18, 110.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid at para 81.
42. Ibid at para 85.
43. Ibid at para 95 citing Quieting of Titles Act, RSN 1970, c 324, s 13, which is today QTA, supra
note 1, s 16.
44. QTA, supra note 1, s 11.
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they do not. In both Pawlett and Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia, the superior
claimant holding legal title declined to release their claim to the applicant,
leading the applicant to seek, in essence, specific performance through the
Act. In both instances, the Court of Appeal is correct that such a proceeding
is an improper use of the QTA. There is no need for further investigation
where the applicant knows they do not have title and knows that the
legal titleholder contests the claim. Pawlett met both of these criteria,
and the Court of Appeal overturned the certificate.45 Bonavista-TrinityPlacentia met only the second criterion, and the Court of Appeal remitted
the matter for further consideration of the applicant’s title claim.46 The
Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia decision was not without controversy, even
within the Court itself, hence a 2:1 split of the Court. While the decision is
undisturbed, it cannot be said to reflect settled law. The broader application
of both decisions should be considered, as well as whether the rules they
set out are indeed applicable to all proceedings under the QTA.
To date, no appellate authority has expressly reconsidered Pawlett or
Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia. It is the nature of the common law system that
a particular constellation of facts and rulings is required to bring the matter
forward for express reconsideration. It is also the nature of the system that
written decisions rarely emanate from uncontested matters. There is no
reason to appeal a successful uncontested quieting or to publish written
reasons on an uncontested proceeding.
One should note the more recent Court of Appeal decision in Re Dyer
Estate, where a unanimous panel held that the requirements of the QTA “are
designed to provide enough evidence to satisfy the court that it would be
appropriate to make an order in rem that binds third parties.”47 Dyer Estate
involved the appeal of a rejection of a certificate of title to an adverse
claimant, who had not filed a counterpetition or originating application
seeking title. The trial judge had accepted that the adverse claimants
had been in open, notorious, continuous and exclusive occupation of the
land at issue, but had only intervened as adverse claimants. The question
at issue before the Court of Appeal was the scope of the trial judge’s
jurisdiction to make a title determination on behalf of an adverse party.
The matter before the Court of Appeal in Dyer Estate was an uncontested
declaration of title by the trial judge in favour of the adverse claimants
(as appellants), but one in which the trial judge was procedurally unable

45.
46.
47.

Pawlett, supra note 24 at para 9.
Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia, supra note 3 at paras 8, 18, 21-22, 110.
Dyer Estate, supra note 12 at para 11.
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to provide meaningful relief to the appellants.48 No party appeared on the
appeal to challenge either the trial judge’s ruling on the appellants’ title, or
to argue against the appellants’ position. In commenting on the complex
title issues before the trial judge, the Court of Appeal appeared to accept
a more flexible approach to the QTA, finding that parcels dealt with on
QTA applications “raise peculiar difficulties” because they “have passed
for many years from person to person in a haphazard, poorly documented
fashion. Such parcels of real estate often have been the subject of rounds
of casual conveyances, inheritances, and adverse possessions.”49 This
case appears to adopt a looser standard than in Pawlett or BonavistaTrinity-Placentia that is more consonant with Justice Marshall’s historical
analysis of the Act. Relying on Dyer Estate as an accurate statement of
law, claims would no longer be held to a standard of good title as required
in Pawlett and Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia, but instead to a standard of
“enough evidence to satisfy the Court.”50 These judicial standards would
seem at odds with one another. The Court of Appeal in Dyer Estate makes
no reference to the prior decisions or the standards they set out. No
subsequent decision of the Supreme Court reconciles these positions or
comments on the discrepancy.
The reason for the differing standards lies in the context. Pawlett and
Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia are not directly applicable to uncontested
proceedings. As Justice Goodridge noted in O’Brien, an ex parte quieting is
an investigatory proceeding. The QTA is a comprehensive code for dealing
with the investigatory model. An application may begin and end within the
investigatory proceeding. An adverse claim begins a contested inter partes
proceeding and generally follows the rules applicable to all such litigation.
Once a matter ceases to be investigatory, the court must decide whether
or not the applicant has a superior claim in light of the claim raised by the
adverse claimant.51 In that context, the decisions in Pawlett and BonavistaTrinity-Placentia make sense. The applicant cannot succeed if confronted
by a superior titleholder claiming an interest in the property. The adverse
claimant does not even need to have a superior claim to the property; they
need only be a party who challenges the applicant’s right to the property
claimed.52 Once the applicant’s claim of title is directly challenged, the
48. See infra note 52.
49. Dyer Estate, supra note 12.
50. Ibid at para 11.
51. O’Brien, supra note 23 at paras 43-47.
52. See e.g. Crowley v Crowley (1984), 51 Nfld & PEIR 140, 150 APR 140 (Nfld SC (TD)), where
the adverse claimant was a trespasser on land claimed by the applicant. Neither party satisfied the court
of their own title. However, the applicant’s application was dismissed, as the adverse claimant had
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nature of the proceeding changes accordingly, and so too does the standard
of the court’s review.
III. Uncontested proceedings: putting appellate decisions into context
As previously demonstrated, courts have set different standards which
claimants must meet under a QTA application, a difference which
can partially be attributed to the decisions’ differing factual contexts.
However, the context of the dispute accounts for only part of the difference
in standards. If the process is different depending on whether or not
the application is contested, one must also consider whether or not the
standards of title are different when the proceeding is uncontested. Recall
that the QTA contains no statutory measure of title, and section 13 of the
Act affords a broad discretion to the trial judge on the question of title.
The appellate caselaw indicates that a strict standard will be applied in
examining the applicant’s title, but this arises in the context of assessing
the applicant’s claim against a competing claimant. In such a contest, it is
appropriate that the applicant be held to a standard of title that supersedes
that of the adverse claimant and survives the challenge posed by the
adverse claim. Such a strict standard is unnecessary when dealing with an
uncontested claim of title, where there is no other claimant to whose claim
the applicant’s title can be compared. One could liken the strict standard in
the uncontested context to determining the winner of a single-person race.
Where the applicant’s title rests on a reasonable foundation supporting
the claim, and that claim is not challenged, there is no reason why the
applicant should not succeed.
The question of what constitutes acceptable title can be vexing to both
lawyers and judges. Researching caselaw under the QTA to find answers
gives the impression that one must already have good title to obtain a
certificate of title, based on Pawlett and Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia.
These decisions do not highlight the substantive legal difference between
the nature of contested and uncontested proceedings under the QTA. The
appellate decisions do not express the narrow scope in which they operate.
To the outside observer, the appellate rules apply to all proceedings under
the QTA.

successfully challenged the applicant’s title. The adverse claimant cannot obtain title on the applicant’s
quieting, thus there is no requirement that adverse claimants prove satisfactory title into themselves.
On this point, see also In Re Coleman (1934), 13 Nfld LR 149 (SC en banc on appeal) at 159-160.
Issues beyond the limited question of the applicant’s title are coram non judice. While an adverse
claimant cannot get title, an adverse claimant’s interests may still encumber the Applicant’s title. See
infra note 64.

14 The Dalhousie Law Journal

The uncontested and unreported nature of successful quietings at the
trial level give no guidance to lawyers or judges as to the expectations
within the investigatory context. The O’Brien decision demonstrates
how an investigatory proceeding is distinct from a contested proceeding.
However, the nature of the investigatory model means lawyers and courts
will not know of the standards and processes employed in uncontested
proceedings. The lawyer who examines the QTA based only on reported
decisions will be left with a misleading impression about the expected
standard of title, which may give rise to a reluctance to utilize the Act for
its intended purpose, given the impression that a claim based on defective
title cannot succeed. However, such an impression is incorrect. Lawyers
and judges alike develop an expectation of the Act based on their personal
involvement with such proceedings. Both judges and lawyers must consider
the common expectation in dealing with Quieting of Titles proceedings:
that an applicant has a legitimate claim of title that cannot readily be dealt
with by other means. If that claim is uncontested, the expectation should
be that the claim is acknowledged and accepted by the community at large.
Strictly applying Pawlett and Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia on every
application, contested or uncontested, would leave no effective way to
address title concerns through the courts or rectify the myriad issues that
arise. This would be inimical to the purposes of the QTA. We will have
come full circle, where the same issues that plagued the Western Union
Telegraph Company a century ago have re-emerged. Individuals asserting
ownership of land would have no effective mechanism to confirm their
titles or render them marketable. This cannot be taken as the intent in
passing the QTA—the legislative purpose would be undone. The Act
remains substantially unchanged one hundred years after its initial passage,
so no policy interventions could lead one to conclude its initial objective
has changed.
The history of the Act indicates that imperfect title is not an impediment
to a certificate of title. In fact, the purpose behind the Act is to allow
perfection of imperfect title. On a contested proceeding, it is logical that
the party with superior title will succeed, and that the true owner cannot be
compelled to relinquish their legal claim against their will. However, when
there is no adverse claimant and no apparent challenge to an applicant’s
imperfect title, matters ironically become more complicated for the Court.
One must examine the process to determine the scope and timing of the
examination of title, and how this impacts the review standard.
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1. The two-stage uncontested process

Determining the standards of title to apply requires an examination of
the uncontested procedure. The QTA creates a two-stage process: preadvertising and post-advertising
At the first stage, an applicant must present a prima facie case on an
ex parte basis to advertise the claim. A certificate of title cannot be issued
without first publishing notice of the claim.53 The court must review the
materials filed with the originating application to determine if the claim
should proceed to advertising. To trigger an investigation of title, the
applicant need only show that the claim is not frivolous and should be
investigated.54 A claimant who cannot meet this low threshold should
not be permitted to the advertising stage. The applicant’s title must rest
on some claim of entitlement to the land, be it colour of title or adverse
possession, in order to meet this threshold.55 While the initial threshold
for advertising is low, courts should be prepared to grant the certificate of
title on the basis of the materials filed if no adverse claims arise.56 This is
a sensible proposition: courts should not set the applicant up for failure by
permitting advertising when they know the claim cannot succeed.
At the post-advertising stage, the court then determines whether the
applicant’s claim of title succeeds. If no adverse claims have arisen, the
applicant should expect to succeed. However, if the Court of Appeal’s
statements on the standard of title in Pawlett and Bonavista-TrinityPlacentia are binding in the uncontested context, any title defect must
result in a failure of the applicant’s claim. The Court of Appeal does not
make a distinction between contested and uncontested proceedings in these
decisions. While it may be technically right to deny an uncontested claim
on a technical or insignificant flaw, it is at a minimum inequitable and a
disservice to the legislative intent. On a review of the legislative history of
the QTA, it would seem to be an error to do so, where no objections to the
applicant’s title are raised.
If a title issue is identified by the court at either stage, the court must
consider whether the title impediment or flaw creates a theoretical legal
problem or an actual problem. A theoretical legal problem may arise where
there is imperfect compliance with technical legal requirements, but no
53. QTA, supra note 1, s 12(1).
54. Re Parsons (1987), 68 Nfld & PEIR 181 at para 3, 209 APR 181 (Nfld SC (TD)) [Parsons].
55. See e.g. Gosse v Murphy, 2008 NLCA 26; George, supra note 30.
56. This has been included in the Judge’s Practice Manual for this province for many years. A judge
receiving an order for publication should be satisfied that the certificate would be granted, barring an
adverse claim. See Kippens (Town) v Doucette (1988), 10 ACWS (3d) 69, 1988 CarswellNfld 348 at
para 39 (Nfld SC (TD)).
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adverse claimants appear to challenge the issue. An actual problem may
arise where there is a superior titleholder identified, which may convert
the matter from an investigatory proceeding to an adversarial one, if the
other titleholder challenges the applicant’s claim. Once identified, such a
problem requires the court to investigate further by serving notice on other
parties, as contemplated by the Act. However, the matter does not cease
to become investigatory until an adverse claim is filed. The court must be
careful not to create an adversarial proceeding without an adversary. If the
legal impediment is not challenged by an adverse party with an interest in
the issue, it should not be the court’s place to frustrate the process of its
own motion. The court is investigating whether the title “may be safely
granted,” not whether title is perfect. It may well be that the applicant’s
title is sufficiently well accepted that the title deficiency is not a practical
matter in the real world. One should bear in mind the admonition of Justice
Green (as he then was) in Hollett v Hollett:
It is important, in my view, before seeking to determine, globally, the
application of the legal principles discussed above to the facts of the
case, that an attempt should be made to characterize the nature of the
interest that was really intended to be created or which best accords with
the apparent expectations of the parties. Such a characterization should
determine the nature of the analysis to be subsequently undertaken.
...
This case in many ways typifies the informal arrangements which
frequently are involved in land holding in rural Newfoundland. It seems
to me that a court ought to be sensitive to the fact that land holding,
from a practical point of view, is often based upon arrangements
which do not fit neatly into formal legal categories. If courts take too
formalistic an approach to the application of property law concepts in
such circumstances, the result may be the frustration of normal social
expectations. I note that in other contexts relating to real property law
in Newfoundland, the courts have in fact modified traditional legal
principles to take account of local conditions...57

When analyzing a quieting, it is important to start from the proposition
that the applicant has a legitimate basis for his or her claim, but that the
applicant’s claim will fall short of providing clear title on its own. If the
applicant could prove title on their own, they would not be before the court
seeking certification. Considering the peculiarities of title in Newfoundland
and Labrador and the remedial intention of the QTA, the court should
57. Hollett v Hollett (1993), 106 Nfld & PEIR 271 at paras 115, 117, 334 APR 271 (Nfld SC (TD))
[Hollett].
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expect to deal with defective title whenever the Act is engaged. Such
defective title may well be recognized by all others who could claim an
interest in the property. It may be recognized by the community, it may
be recognized by other family members, it may even have the cloak of
official recognition by municipalities assessing taxes. Taking a pragmatic
approach, and bearing in mind the language of the Act, the test is whether
or not the applicant can be “safely granted” the certificate, or whether the
applicant is “entitled to the land.”58 Thus, a wide latitude is appropriate on
title throughout an investigatory proceeding.
Though wide latitude is appropriate, the court must also be “satisfied
respecting the title” that the applicant “is entitled to the land”.59 Where the
court identifies any concerns on title, section 11 of the QTA requires the
court to give the applicant an opportunity to produce further evidence or
remove defects in the evidence.60 Section 11 has no temporal limitation, so
it can arise pre-advertising or post-advertising. In the case of Re Parsons,
this issue arose in the context of a claim involving an unprobated estate.
The applicant had been permitted to advertise his claim on its own merits,
with an opportunity to resolve the estate issue post-advertising.61 This was
not fatal to advancing the applicant’s claim, but rather a post-advertising
opportunity to “remove defects” in the title.62 Based on Parsons, defects
at the initial stage are not fatal to the request for an investigation, but
the applicant should be made aware of them and the impediments they
may create at the second stage. When in doubt regarding the effect of an
impediment, the court should defer to the applicant’s claim at the initial
stage but bring the impediment to the applicant’s attention and perhaps
direct specific notice to individuals. This is a matter that warrants further
investigation, rather than dismissal, and can be remedied with a targeted
advertising order.
If the advertising period passes with no adverse claims arising,
whatever concerns there may be about title should be disregarded in the
interests of equity and efficiency. It is not for the court to seek out reasons
58. QTA, supra note 1, s 13(1)-(2).
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid, s 11.
61. Re Parsons, supra note 54 at para 29.
62. See infra re unprobated estates generally. Note that the applicant in Parsons claimed under the
husband’s estate, but the court held that the title to the property was vested in the wife, so the issue
for the applicant to resolve was the necessity of obtaining title from a different estate. Ultimately,
the certificate of title was granted in the Parsons matter on 29 June 1988 (see registered certificate
of title at the Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Deeds, Roll 542, Frame 1259), but there is no
indication in the certificate or in any reported decision about how the matter proceeded after the cited
decision.
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to deny the certificate of its own motion. To do so would put the court
into an adversarial role: the court would raise an issue on behalf of the
interested party who has not elected to participate themselves. This would
be contrary to the investigatory nature of the uncontested proceeding and
the remedial intention of the QTA. It bears repeating that the court is not
being asked to decide whether title is legally sufficient; it is being asked
to determine if the certificate may be “safely granted” to an individual
claiming entitlement to the land. One could liken such a failure to file an
adverse claim to any other form of default in civil litigation, which would
entitle the claimant to an order in his or her favour.63 Where an adverse
claim is filed, the substance of that claim is important. If the adverse
claim does not challenge the applicant’s ownership of the land at issue,
the certificate of title can be granted without addressing the substance of
the adverse claim, though the interest raised may be determined within the
quieting at the court’s discretion.64
The reason for the general language of the Act becomes clearer at the
post-advertising stage. The title may still be defective, but the applicant
will have demonstrated that he or she has some entitlement to the land
(which must be demonstrated before advertising), and the degree to which
the applicant’s claim is contested will be apparent after advertising. If
no contest arises post-advertising, the court can find that the title may be
“safely granted,” as the legislated standard requires.65
2. A comparative approach: The Nova Scotia Land Titles Clarification
Act
One finds an analogous context to the uncontested quieting in the Nova
Scotia Supreme Court’s decision in Downey v Nova Scotia (Attorney
General).66 This case arises under Nova Scotia’s Land Titles Clarification
Act, a remedial title statute intended to clarify land tenure in predominantly
Black areas of Nova Scotia, where undocumented possessory title and

63. See generally rule 16 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1986, SNL 1986, c 42, Schedule D.
64. See e.g. Power Motors 1993, supra note 12, where Justice Woolridge granted leave to hear options
to purchase land in the context of the applicant’s quieting. The adverse claims created “equitable
interests,” though none of the adverse claimants asserted ownership of the applicant’s property. This
is permissible under s 3(2) of the QTA. In Re Noel Quieting of Titles (unreported Memorandum of
Disposition, 31 December 2018), Grand Bank #2017 06G 0081 (NLSC) [Noel], the adverse claimant
asserted a public right-of-way through the applicants’ land. Justice Handrigan issued the certificate
of title without deciding the right-of-way issue, holding that the right-of-way, if valid, would survive
issuance of the certificate of title under s 22(1)(e) of the QTA, and that the applicants should first be
decreed owners of the land in order to respond to the claim.
65. QTA, supra note 1, s 13(1).
66. 2020 NSSC 201 [Downey].
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informalities in transfers created uncertainty in property rights.67 There are
direct parallels between Nova Scotia’s situation and that in Newfoundland
and Labrador:
Residents in African Nova Scotian communities are more likely to have
unclear title to land on which they may have lived for many generations.
That is because in those communities, informal arrangements were more
common. Financial and other obstacles made it less likely that people
in those communities would retain lawyers and surveyors to research
title, register deeds or wills, or survey boundaries. People may have lived
on the land for generations without having title registered. No one else
might claim it and it may be that no one in the community disputes their
entitlement to it. But they still have no formal title.68

The LTCA uses an administrative process to confirm title, so the Downey
decision is a judicial review of an administrative body’s decision.
Nevertheless, it sets out the appropriate standard for evaluation of land
titles under the LTCA. The notable parallel between the LTCA and the
Newfoundland QTA is the absence of specific criteria for granting a
certificate of title. Neither act specifies absolute rules for obtaining or
denying title. As noted by Justice Campbell in Downey:
[The LTCA] does not require that a claimant establish a period of 20
years of adverse possession or provide information that would allow
the Department to assess whether the property had been occupied for
20 years. It contains no reference at all to adverse possession or facts
that would establish a claim of adverse possession. ...The legislation
is silent on the basis upon which entitlement is established. There are
no regulations. The legislation does not specifically require a period of
possession for 20 years, but it may be presumed that entitlement must be
based on some objective criteria in order for that issue to be assessed.69

Newfoundland and Labrador’s QTA is similarly silent on what is required
for a certificate of title, leaving it to the discretion of the court to be
“satisfied” with the applicant’s title.70 It would be open to the legislature to
impose requirements and benchmarks for the issuance of title. That would
not be desirable, given the legislative purpose. The QTA is broadly written
for a reason.

67. RSNS 1989, c 250 [LTCA]. See also the detailed history of the LTCA in Beals v Nova Scotia
(Attorney General), 2020 NSSC 60 at paras 20-39.
68. Downey, supra note 66 at para 5. Compare to the similar context in Newfoundland and Labrador:
see generally discussion of title in French, “Property Interests” and French, “Abolition of Adverse
Possession,” supra note 4.
69. Downey, supra note 66 at paras 27-28.
70. QTA, supra note 1, ss 13(1)-13(2) .
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Justice Campbell went further in Downey, holding that looking for
adverse possession would be inimical to the purposes of the LTCA.71
Adverse possession may arise as a defence to an adverse claim, if an
adverse claim is asserted. Failure to meet the prescribed limitation period
is not fatal when looking at a remedial statute for the rectification of title.
Indeed, as noted by both Justice Campbell in Downey and Justice Green in
Hollett, the methods of land transfer and peculiar practices of land holding
in their respective jurisdictions mean the decision-maker must look at
the application contextually and not remain hidebound to strict rules of
establishing good title.72 Both provinces’ processes contemplate title not
being in order and applicants presenting claims that may be recognized
and uncontested that nevertheless fall short of the standards of good
title. This is consistent with the rule in Perry v Clissold, long applied in
Newfoundland and Labrador, that one in peaceable possession of land is
presumed to have good title against the world unless another person can
demonstrate better title.73
Downey was an uncontested application for title. The Downeys’
application was denied by the administrative decision maker on its
own motion. There is no indication that the Crown or any other party
intervened to object to the Downeys’ title at the adjudicative stage. The
Nova Scotia Supreme Court overturned the administrative decision
maker’s ruling denying the uncontested title application. The approach
of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court provides an appropriate parallel case
for the Newfoundland courts to consider in the context of uncontested
quietings. The Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court should follow
the largely unfettered discretion in the QTA to grant title where the claim
to title is uncontested.

3. Unreported and uncontested outcomes under the QTA

In practice, there are many examples of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland
and Labrador following a Downey-like procedure for title examination.
However, those decisions proceeded ex parte, with no adverse claims,
and thus no written reasons. It is a quirk of the operation of the QTA:
the uncontested cases that flow successfully do not set written precedent,
they are resolved with the issuance of a certificate of title. These cases
demonstrate how the process works in everyday practice and routine
71. Downey, supra note 66 at paras 32-35.
72. Ibid at para 5; Hollett, supra note 57 at para 117.
73. Perry v Clissold (1906), [1907] AC 73, 4 CLR 374. For its application in Newfoundland and
Labrador, see House v Glovertown (Town) (1977), 17 Nfld & PEIR 416 at para 71, 46 APR 416 (nfld
SC (TD)); Re Chaytor (1980), 27 Nfld & PEIR 310 at para 78, 74 APR 310 (Nfld SC (TD)).
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matters, but they are undiscoverable by traditional research methods.
Practitioners and judges who are familiar with the QTA operate from
an understanding of the QTA based on experience, but that experience
is not reported. The reported caselaw under the QTA gives an erroneous
impression of how the QTA operates in practice. The cases that reach the
Court of Appeal will only arise in narrow contested circumstances. Those
who rely only on legal research into the QTA will find the standards too
daunting to effectively employ the Act for its intended purpose.
Consider the estate context as an example. In Re Parsons, an intrafamily dispute arose about entitlement to a property as between the
claimants through a husband and wife.74 The applicant’s predecessor in
title was the husband, and the applicant claimed through the husband’s
unprobated will. The possession at issue ended long before the passage of
the Family Law Act, which would have created a statutory joint tenancy in
the matrimonial home.75 Justice Cameron ruled that the wife was entitled
to the subject property by adverse possession, rather than the husband; and
the applicant, applying under the will of the late husband, was given an
opportunity to present the chain of title from the wife. However, Justice
Cameron did provide that “[i]f the will of [the husband] is not admitted to
probate leave is granted to the applicant to apply for a determination of his
interest on intestacy of [the husband].”76 This ruling is somewhat unclear:
does this statement permit the applicant to seek a declaration of his interest
in the absence of probate, or does it allow for a determination of the interests
of the applicant only upon seeking administration of an intestate estate on
failure of the will? Justice Cameron’s reasons are ambiguous. Earlier in
her reasons, she states: “The fact that the will has not been probated will
be relevant to a determination of whether or not a declaration should be
made at this time but is not fatal to the application.”77 This case does not
hold that probate is a requirement under the QTA. Rather, it leaves the
determination of that point to the future. A strict application of Pawlett,
the leading case at the time Parsons was decided, would hold that such
a failure was fatal to the application, and the applicant could not seek a
certificate of title without either a legal or possessory estate. Yet Justice
Cameron does not dispose of the matter on that basis or state that it is
a requirement. Notably, there is an adverse claim in this matter, but it is
74. Parsons, supra note 54.
75. RSNL 1990, c F-2, s 8(1). The statutory joint tenancy in the matrimonial home was created by
the Matrimonial Property Act, SN 1979, c 32, effective 1 July 1980. The possession at issue in Parsons
ended around 1945: see Parsons, supra note 54 at para 5.
76. Parsons, supra note 54 at para 29.
77. Ibid at para 3.
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not an adverse claim on the wife’s estate, it is an adverse claim by the
descendants of the wife’s siblings. The court held that the wife was the
proper locus of title, and neither the applicant nor the adverse claimants
claimed directly through her. Had the wife’s estate been engaged and
opposed the application, the outcome may well have mirrored Pawlett.
That it did not is telling. Ultimately, the certificate of title was issued to the
applicant in Parsons, though no written decision clarifies how the matter
was resolved.78
The recent decision of our Court of Appeal in Power Estate v
Hayward raises further confusion.79 Power Estate involved an appeal
of a rejected application for a portion of land north of St. John’s, which
had belonged to the applicant’s father previously, and which was divided
into four parcels for the purposes of the application. The application was
contested by nine adverse claimants, including siblings of the applicant.
At the trial level, Justice Adams rejected the application for title to two
parcels of land, indicating that the applicant had failed to establish either
documentary or possessory title as against his siblings.80 The applicant
appealed and the trial judge’s decision was upheld. It is noteworthy for
the purposes of this section that the majority of the Court of Appeal
commented briefly on the failure to administer the father’s estate.81 The
majority merely notes that the father’s estate was unadministered, and the
legal interests of the siblings as beneficiaries of the father’s estate “have
not been judicially determined.”82 The concurring reasons of Justice Butler
go further, indicating that the legal title being vested in the estate and not
adversely possessed could not sufficiently ground title.83 In the context of
the Power Estate case, these comments are not determinative of the lis
inter partes: the appeal turned on the question of whether the applicant had
sufficiently divested his siblings by possession. No allegation appears to
have been asserted that the father’s estate was the proper owner of the title.
Rather, it was a question of whether the applicant had sufficiently divested
the adverse claimants. When one considers the context of a contested
quieting, as distinct from an uncontested quieting, it stands to reason that
the applicant’s failure of possessory title and absence of legal title causes
the application to fail when it is actively contested. It is not a question
of technical adherence to rules establishing title, it is a question of the
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See supra note 62.
2021 NLCA 58.
Power Estate (Re), 2020 NLSC 85, paras 77-78.
Supra note 79 at paras 17-19.
Ibid at para 18.
Ibid at paras 32-42.
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prejudice to the interests of adverse claimants. The adverse claimants were
not dispossessed by the applicant, and thus had as much of an interest in
the property at issue as the applicant himself, based on the principles of
intestate succession. The Court of Appeal’s comments in this case indicate
a troubling adherence to technical strictures of law, but this should not be
seen to apply in the uncontested quieting context. The comments on the
failure to administer the estate and the interests of the adverse claimants
was obiter to the matter at hand. The appeal concerned the interest of the
applicants against his siblings as adverse claimants, and not of the parties
generally as against the uninvolved estate.
In considering this debate, one should note that the Supreme Court
of Newfoundland and Labrador has repeatedly granted certificates of title
to land in uncontested proceedings where estates were never probated
but beneficiaries had released their interest, or where an unprobated will
accounted for the transfer without adverse possession divesting the estates’
interests. Recent examples of this include Re Dyke Quieting of Titles;84 Re
Smart Quieting of Titles;85 Re Churchill Quieting of Titles;86 Re Ducey
Quieting of Titles;87 Re Smith Quieting of Titles;88 and Re Cull and Pike
Quieting of Titles.89 These recent unreported cases reflect the appropriate
84. Re Dyke Quieting of Titles (unreported, certificate issued 14 November 2020), Grand Bank
#2015 06G 0177 (NLSC). Property at Eastport was contained in a Crown grant. The applicant claimed
title through the unprobated will of his grandfather, who died in 1965. The land had been vacant from
1965 to 2013, when the applicant built a home on it.
85. Re Smart Quieting of Titles (unreported, certificate issued 13 October 2017), Grand Bank #2017
06G 0036 (NLSC). A property at Glovertown was contained in a Crown grant. The property was
possessed until 2008, when the applicant’s predecessor in title died. The applicant proceeded with
deeds of release from the next of kin of the decedent.
86. Re Churchill Quieting of Titles (unreported, certificate issued 3 January 2017), Grand Bank
#2016 06G 0081 (NLSC). A property at Hodge’s Cove was contained in a Crown grant. It had been
vacant for at least 30 years; the last occupant of the land had died in 1990. An unprobated will left the
property to one George Churchill, who died in 2000 without entering into possession. The Estate of
George Churchill was not probated, but the applicant proceeded with deeds of release from the next of
kin of George Churchill.
87. Re Ducey Quieting of Titles (unreported, certificate issued 7 June 2017), Grand Bank #2017
06G 0019 (NLSC) [Ducey]. A property at Garnish was not contained within a Crown grant. Usage
of the property for agricultural purposes traced from pre-1949 until the early 1970s. Buildings on the
property were removed by the late 1970s, and no subsequent use was made of the property thereafter.
Its last user died in 1986, and the land was deeded to the applicant by the deceased’s son without
probate of the last user’s estate. No registered documents relating to the property were found.
88. Re Smith Quieting of Titles (unreported, certificate issued 29 June 2018), Grand Bank #2017 06G
0157 (NLSC). Property at Port Rexton was contained in a Crown grant. The applicant claimed title by
deeds of release from great-great-grandchildren of the original grantholder, who had died in the 1920s.
The property had never been occupied by anyone.
89. Re Cull and Pike Quieting of Titles (unreported, certificate issued 24 October 2019), Grand
Bank #2017 06G 0133 (NLSC). Property at Bonavista contained in a Crown grant had been used as
farmland for at least twenty years prior to the death of its occupier in 2014. The occupier’s widow and
children executed deeds of conveyance to the applicants in 2017.
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outcome envisaged by the QTA on uncontested matters and are correct at
law, as they accurately reflect the legislative standard of the applicant’s
“entitle[ment] to the land.”90 Such deeds of release would not constitute
good title in the marketplace due to the provisions of the Chattels Real
Act.91 Nevertheless, they do provide a “legal basis” for an applicant to
proceed with a claim to a given property by grounding the applicant’s
“entitlement” to the property.92 This is consistent with the Act and with the
ruling in Re Parsons.
The author has reviewed cases on which he has personal knowledge
and experience from the Supreme Court’s Judicial District of Grand
Bank in the last ten years. The Judicial District of Grand Bank handles
an outsized number of QTA proceedings for its size: 35 per cent of the
quieting of title certificates which were registered at the Registry of Deeds
since 2012 are from matters filed in the Grand Bank District, the secondhighest percentage in the province, behind only the Judicial District of St.
John’s.93 The majority of these cases are unreported, but they demonstrate a
flexible and pragmatic approach in keeping with the principles underlying
the QTA and appropriately treating matters of uncontested title. These
cases are examples of how titles have been granted where title may be
defective or uncertain in practice but is nevertheless valid and accepted by
the community.
Such unreported cases have dealt with longstanding historical title
that was premised on unregistered legal conveyances but recognized in
90. QTA, supra note 1, s 13(2). Note Justice Marshall’s concurring reasons in Russell v Blundon,
2002 NFCA 20 at para 43, wherein he held that “colour of title” includes an entitlement to seek legal
title, which includes a right to claim an interest through an unprobated estate in that case.
91. RSNL 1990, c C-11. See also Mugford v Mugford (1992), 103 Nfld & PEIR 136, 326 APR 126
(Nfld SC (CA)), holding that the beneficiaries of an estate have an interest only in the estate, not
specific estate property.
92. The “legal basis” reference has been read conjunctively with the statutory requirement for
satisfaction of the court that a certificate should issue, on a standard of a balance of probabilities. See
George, supra note 30 at paras 4-5.
93. A search of the Registry of Deeds’ CADO system (supra note 20) by document type “Quieting
of Titles” for the ten-year period prior to publication of this paper (1 January 2012 to 10 March 2022)
discloses 264 results. Each certificate identifies the court file number, which identifies the court centre
in which it was filed. On review of these 264 certificates, 135 are from the St. John’s centre, 93 are
from Grand Bank, 14 are from each of Gander and Corner Brook, 5 are from Grand Falls–Windsor,
and one is from Happy Valley–Goose Bay. The remaining two results are late registrations from the
defunct Brigus centre. Using the number of sitting judges per district as a proxy for court activity,
the judicial district of St. John’s has 22 resident justices. The judicial district of Grand Bank has
one, although four different justices have acted as resident justice for Grand Bank in the last ten
years. Judiciary By Region (last visited 1 June 2022), online: Supreme Court of Newfoundland and
Labrador <court.nl.ca/supreme/general/jregion.html> [perma.cc/3MPY-M6AT]. 73% of the justices
of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador are in the judicial district of St. John’s, versus
3% in Grand Bank. Despite this vast discrepancy, 50% of quietings went through St. John’s, and 35%
went through Grand Bank.
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the community without accompanying possession. In Re Maybee Quieting
of Titles, the applicant claimed title to two parcels of land at Trinity.94
One parcel was rooted in an 1850 Crown grant and an 1862 registered
conveyance, followed by a century of unregistered transactions by bills
of sale without accompanying use. The second parcel was recorded
on a Crown Lands map of the area from 1852 and had been used until
approximately 1970 with no deeds of conveyance. The latter parcel was not
known to have been granted. Neither parcel was contested, and a certificate
of title was issued to the applicant for both parcels notwithstanding the
title defects and long absences of possession.
Long periods of vacancy following longstanding use were also not
bars to obtaining certificates of title in Ducey95 and in Re Nancy Joanne
Ltd Quieting of Titles.96 Both cases involved vacancy of the land for a
period of over thirty years. While both cases rested on adverse possession
which had ended long before proceedings commenced in either of these
matters, the ownership claim was still recognized in the community
as demonstrated by affidavits of possession. No issues were raised as
to possible abandonment, and the long vacancy of the land was not a
hindrance to obtaining title, even though title in both cases did not arise
from a Crown grant. In the case of Ducey, no documentary title existed in
relation to the land at all.
In several known examples, missing deeds would perfect title to
land, but certificates of title were nevertheless issued in the absence of
any adverse claim. These examples include cases where pedal possession
related to a part of the larger undeeded whole97 and instances of missing
written conveyances.98 In these cases, the absence of written deeds was
94. Re Maybee Quieting of Titles (unreported, certificate issued 2 May 2019), Grand Bank #2019
06G 0006 (NLSC).
95. Ducey, supra note 87.
96. Re Nancy Joanne Ltd Quieting of Titles (unreported, certificate issued 10 February 2016), Grand
Bank #2015 06G 0106 (NLSC). Property at Twillingate. The concise statement of facts records that
the property had a dwelling house present on it from 1854 to 1979, and the property was recorded in
deeds registered in the 1940s and 1960s. There was no Crown grant to the land, and there were no
transfers from certain titleholders named in the 1960s deeds. The property was vacant since 1979.
97. See e.g. Re Butt Quieting of Titles (unreported, certificate issued 26 February 2018), Grand Bank
#2017 06G 0134 (NLSC); Noel, supra note 64; Re Martin Quieting of Titles (unreported, certificate
issued 29 October 2018), Grand Bank #2016 06G 0175 (NLSC); Re Jewer Quieting of Titles,
(unreported, certificate issued 10 February 2016), Grand Bank #2015 06G 0152 (NLSC) [Jewer];
Re Moody Quieting of Titles, (unreported, certificate issued 7 June 2021), Grand Bank #2015 06G
0023 (NLSC); Re Perry Quieting of Titles, (unreported, certificate issued 7 April 2016), Grand Bank
#2014 06G 0186 (NLSC). These cases all involved a dwelling house on one part of a larger parcel of
land, whereby use and possession of the larger surrounding land was recognized by the community as
relating to the residential portion.
98. Re Brothers Services Inc Quieting of Titles, (unreported, certificate issued 15 December 2020),
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coupled with possession and occupation and supported by affidavits of
possession confirming that the larger parcel was subsumed into the use
of the smaller portion thereof. In at least one known instance, a certificate
of title was issued in the absence of a deed and without accompanying
possession of sufficient length.99
The success of these quietings is in keeping with the admonition of
Justice Aylward in the contested case of Shea v Shea: there must be some
evidence of seisin, or of a legal estate in the land.100 Shea involved the
wrongful inclusion of another individual’s land in the applicant’s quieting,
but no adverse claim was filed during the quieting investigation, and the
applicant received title uncontested. The other landowner commenced an
action to reopen the applicant’s quieting and recover his land on the basis
that the applicant had no entitlement to that portion of land notwithstanding
the successful quieting. Justice Aylward held that the QTA was not intended
to give title to an individual with no basis for their claim and removed the
contested portion from the applicant’s certificate of title.101 This rule would
seem to be of general application given the language of sections 3 and
13 of the QTA. The applicant must prove some entitlement to the land,
whether the claim is investigatory or contested, though the entitlement
need not rise to the level of perfect title.
If there are deeds to the land, the applicant may have a deemed legal
estate by colour of title, regardless of whether the underlying title is valid
or the deeds defective.102 Even where a deed may be missing, colour of
title may still be relied upon if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis to
support the claim and existence of such an instrument.103 If there is actual
Grand Bank #2019 06G 0131 (NLSC); Re Newhook Quieting of Titles, (unreported, certificate issued
24 October 2019), Grand Bank #2018 06G 0156 (NLSC); Jewer, supra note 97. These cases involved
land aggregated into a single parcel by multiple separate transactions, but with missing deeds of such
transfers.
99. Re Crawford Quieting of Titles (unreported, certificate issued 3 March 2022), Grand Bank
#2020 06G 0029 (NLSC) [Crawford]. The applicant purchased the subject property from the Crown
in 1972 on public tender, but the deed of the transfer was unregistered and lost. The applicant occupied
the subject property for only four years before leaving the property. The tendering advertisement
from 1972 was located, and affidavits filed indicating that the applicant had entered into possession
following his purchase.
100. 1986 CarswellNfld 383 at para 27, 1 ACWS (3d) 147 (Nfld SC (TD)).
101. Such authority for the trial judge to reopen the proceeding after issuance of the certificate of title
is provided for. See QTA, supra note 1, s 34 .
102. If an individual entering into possession of land based on documentary title is in possession
of part of it, he or she is deemed to be in possession of the whole, even if the title underlying the
document is defective or the title invalid. See Boyd v Luscombe and Hicks (1986), 57 Nfld & PEIR
242 at para 36, 170 APR 242 (Nfld (DC)); Stringer v Stringer, 2006 NLCA 64; Walsh v Greeley, 2011
NLTD(G) 2; Rendell v Steele, 2016 NLTD(G) 24 at paras 33-34.
103. Murphy v Gosse, 2007 NLTD 161 at paras 17-18. The court can infer the existence of the deed
if there is sufficient factual basis to establish its existence, such as in Crawford (supra note 99), where
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possession to run out the limitation period, then the applicant may have
acquired title by adverse possession regardless of documentary title.
In all of the cases referenced in this article, one or the other instance
applied. In taking a pragmatic approach to the evidence on an uncontested
proceeding, the court can give effect to the legitimate expectations of the
applicant claiming title while also complying with the standards set out in
law. However, the author would go further and suggest that an individual
in possession of land may still be successful on an uncontested quieting
where the limitation period for their possession has not run out, as seen
in the Nova Scotia Supreme Court’s decision in Downey. Shea must be
put into context: the decision arose in a contested proceeding rather than
an uncontested investigation. The rule in Perry v Clissold would apply to
an individual in possession, and the court can address limitation period
concerns by requiring additional notice under section 12 of the Act. The
Shea case is authority preventing an illegitimate “land grab,” whereby an
individual attempts to seek title to land for which they have no legitimate
claim, and an issued certificate of title may be vulnerable on that basis. It
does not stand for a hard and fast requirement that an applicant run out
the full limitation period to obtain a perfected legal estate in the land.
Depending on the context of the application, the applicant’s title may be
presumed by acquiescence or based on some other evidence that the legal
titleholder has satisfactorily given title to the applicant. The approach
at the uncontested level must always be contextual, but the court must
also be satisfied that anyone with a potential adverse claim has been duly
notified.104 Failure to pursue an adverse claim where notice has been served
should give rise to a presumption that the applicant is indeed entitled to the
land and has an accepted legal estate in same.
As can be seen from the foregoing examples, courts have not elected to
impose technical requirements for compliance with legal title where such
steps are perfunctory. The Court of Appeal has endorsed such an approach,
holding in Dyer Estate that “judicial economy is a good reason for an
efficient procedure that is also fair.”105 This approach should be borne in
mind in every quieting: the court need not stand in the way of advancing a
meritorious claim on its own motion and insist on strict compliance with
legalistic requirements where no harm or prejudice is occasioned thereby.
the public tendering advertisement was filed, with accompanying affidavits confirming the applicant
entered into possession. Continued possession may be sufficient as well: see cases at supra note 98.
In such cases, service on the prior owner can address any concerns about missing title documents, if a
prima facie claim of title is made out by the applicant.
104. Downey, supra note 66 at paras 27-28.
105. Dyer Estate, supra note 12 at para 36.
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It is necessary that the court take a flexible and practical approach where
title is uncontested, due to the social conext in which the QTA operates.
This is what the legislature has intended for one hundred years and what
is expected to do justice under the QTA. To do otherwise would be, in
the words of Justice of Appeal Hoegg, “to apply the law in a rigid and
technical manner to a pointless or possibly unjust end.”106
Conclusion
Courts and practitioners must be cautious when looking at reported
caselaw under the QTA. There is a distinction between operation of the Act
in uncontested investigatory proceedings versus contested proceedings
going to litigation. All reported caselaw arises from the second type of
proceeding, so courts must be cautious about its application to uncontested
proceedings. When considering statutory purpose and unreported
decisions, uncontested proceedings operate on a much more flexible
basis, which best serves the legislative intent. This is consistent with the
letter and the spirit of the law. Unfortunately, in the absence of reported
decisions on investigatory proceedings, this approach remains invisible in
jurisprudence, and there remains a risk that courts and practitioners may
take an erroneous interpretation of the Act in uncontested proceedings
based on caselaw from contested proceedings. It is hoped that this paper will
assist those applying the law in the future to better understand the intended
application of the QTA and the conduct of uncontested proceedings.

106. Paro Enterprises Ltd v Murphy, 2015 NLCA 33 at para 39.

